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Abstract 
We develop a closed economy model to study the interactions among sovereign risk 
premia, fiscal limits, and fiscal policy. The stochastic fiscal limits, which measure the 
ability and willingness of the government to service its debt, arise endogenously from a 
dynamic Laffer curve. The distribution of fiscal limits is country-specific, depending on 
the size of the government, the degree of countercyclical policy responses, economic 
diversity, and political uncertainty, among other characteristics. The model rationalizes 
different sovereign ratings across developed countries. A nonlinear relationship between 
sovereign risk premia and the level of government debt, which emerges in equilibrium, is 
consistent with the empirical evidence that once risk premia begin to rise, they do so 
rapidly. Movements in default risk premia for long-term bonds precede those for short-
term bonds, providing early warnings of increasing probabilities of sovereign defaults. 
JEL classification: E62, H30, H60 
Bank classification: Fiscal policy; International topics  
Résumé 
L’auteur élabore un modèle d’économie fermée pour étudier les interactions entre les 
primes de risque souverain, les limites budgétaires et la politique budgétaire. Les limites 
budgétaires stochastiques, qui mesurent la capacité et la volonté de l’État d’assurer le 
service de sa dette, sont tirées de manière endogène d’une courbe dynamique de Laffer. 
La distribution des limites budgétaires est propre à chaque pays, déterminée, entre autres 
caractéristiques, par la taille du secteur public, le degré de contracyclicité de la politique 
budgétaire, la diversité de l’économie et l’incertitude politique. Le  modèle permet 
d’expliquer les cotes différentes attribuées aux pays développés par les agences de 
notation financière. La forme non linéaire de la relation qui émerge à l’équilibre entre les 
primes de risque souverain et le niveau de la dette publique concorde avec ce que 
révèlent les données, à savoir une hausse rapide des primes de risque lorsque ces 
dernières commencent à monter. Les variations qu’enregistrent les primes de risque de 
défaut exigées sur les obligations à long terme précèdent celles qu’accusent les primes 
observées dans le cas des obligations à court terme, signalant de façon précoce 
l’augmentation des probabilités de défaut des emprunteurs souverains. 
Classification JEL : E62, H30, H60 
Classification de la Banque : Politique budgétaire; Questions internationales 
 
 1. Introduction
Developed countries are facing unprecedent ﬁscal challenges as a result of the recent ﬁnancial
crisis. In the wake of deteriorating public ﬁnances, rating agencies downgraded the sovereign
debt of several developed countries in 2009 and 2010. Ireland and Spain were downgraded
by two notches, Portugal by three notches, and Greece by ﬁve notches.1 The spread between
10-year Greek government bonds and equivalent German bonds widened to more than 900
basis points in September 2010. Government debt in developed countries, buoyed by anti-
crisis measures, is projected to rise from an average of about 73 percent of GDP in 2007 to
about 108 percent of GDP in 2015. More broadly, age-related spending in many developed
countries will further raise government indebtedness in the coming decades.
Historical data shows that developed countries have frequently been penalized when
concerns arise about the riskiness of government debt, even though these countries have no
history of default in the post-war period.2 There is also tremendous diversity in the levels of
debt at which downgrades have occurred. Figure 2 compares six countries in three groups:
New Zealand and Canada, Italy and Belgium, and Sweden and Japan. The rating of New
Zealand government debt was reduced by three notches from AAA to AA- as its gross debt
climbed from 58% to 75% of the GDP.3 The Canadian government, on the other hand, was
able to keep its AAA rating until its debt hit 90% of GDP.
The theoretical analysis of ﬁscal policy in developed countries has been largely abstracted
from sovereign default risk by assuming that sovereign debts are always honored, which may
be an innocuous assumption during normal periods. However, since the ﬁnancial markets
have brought ﬁscal concerns to the front page in the current ﬁscal crisis in the Euro area, it is
important for policymakers to understand the interaction between sovereign default risk and
ﬁscal policy. One way to do so is through the use of a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium
(DSGE) framework, which is at the heart of this paper. Using a nonlinear model, we analyze
how the maximum level of debt that the government is able and willing to service, which
we call ﬁscal limit, may depend on macroeconomic fundamentals, and what the quantitative
impact of sovereign default risk upon the economy may be.
In the literature of sovereign default in emerging market economies, see Eaton and Gerso-
vitz (1981) and Arellano (2008) among many other papers, sovereign default has been mod-
1All sovereign ratings in this paper are from Standard & Poor’s.
2Figure 1 depicts the sovereign downgrades of some developed countries since 1975.
3Appendix A provides an explanation of the data.
2eled as an outcome of optimal and strategic decision by the government, which may be a
reasonable assumption for emerging market economies. The predicted level of government
debt at which the sovereign default occurs, however, is much lower than the debt level at
which sovereign risk premia are observed in developed countries, making it diﬃcult to use
those models for policymaking in developed countries. In this paper, we do not model the
sovereign default as a strategic decision, but instead assume that the government defaults
when it is bounded by the ﬁscal limit.
In an attempt to match the sovereign risk premia observed in developed countries,
Juessen, Linnemann, and Schabert (2009) endogenize the sovereign default by assuming
that investors may stop lending whenever the government runs a Ponzi scheme. The dis-
torting tax rate is assumed to be ﬁxed and exogenous. After solving the model through
a second-order approximation, the authors show that the predicted sovereign risk premia
under plausible calibrations fall far short of those observed in the data.
Our paper contributes to the literature by providing a DSGE framework that is suitable
for policymaking in developed countries. First, we allow for an endogenous ﬁscal limit. The
distribution of ﬁscal limits arises endogenously from dynamic Laﬀer curves, which depend
on macroeconomic fundamentals. The predicted distributions of ﬁscal limits for developed
countries are consistent with sovereign downgrades in the data. Second, we allow for en-
dogenous tax policy. The government raises the tax rate when government debt rises, which
aﬀects the outcome of sovereign default. Third, we solve the full nonlinear model using the
monotone mapping method and ﬁnd that the model can produce substantial risk premia
under plausible calibrations. The nonlinear solution is important as the ﬁscal limit can be
far from the steady state of the economy.
We consider a closed economy in which the government ﬁnances an exogenous level of
purchases and countercyclical lump-sum transfers to households by collecting distorting taxes
and issuing non-state-contingent bonds. The bond contracts are not enforceable. The gov-
ernment may partially default if the debt level reaches the ﬁscal limit, which is constrained
by the economy’s dynamic Laﬀer curve and the country’s political willingness to make ﬁscal
adjustments. Dynamic Laﬀer curves, which arise endogenously from distorting taxes, con-
strain the government’s ability to service its debt. If the tax rate is on the “slippery” side of
the Laﬀer curve, then the government is unable to raise more tax revenue through higher tax
rates, even if it has the will to do so. On the other hand, even if it is economically feasible to
increase revenues, the government may be unwilling to raise rates. We treat the willingness
as a political decision unrelated to economic fundamentals.
The distribution of the ﬁscal limit is a set of maximum levels of debt that government
is able and willing to service, given the random disturbances hitting the economy. At each
3period, an eﬀective ﬁscal limit is drawn from the endogenous distribution. If the level of
government debt surpasses the eﬀective ﬁscal limit, then the government reneges on a fraction
of its debt. Households are assumed to know the distribution of the ﬁscal limit. Using this
information, they can decide the quantity of government bonds that they are willing to hold
and the price at which they are willing to purchase the bonds.
A couple of results emerge. First, the distribution of ﬁscal limits, which is country-
speciﬁc, depends on the underlying macroeconomic fundamentals. We calibrate the model
to three groups of countries, Canada and New Zealand, Belgium and Italy, and Japan and
Sweden, and ﬁnd that the predicted distributions of ﬁscal limits are qualitatively consistent
with the observed sovereign downgrades in these countries, as illustrated in Figure 2. A
government with a heavy burden of transfer payments or government purchases has a higher
probability of reaching the peak of the Laﬀer curve and may face a signiﬁcantly lower ﬁscal
limit. Strong countercyclical spending policies, which arise from large automatic stabilizers
or discretionary countercyclical ﬁscal policies, can produce a more dispersed distribution of
ﬁscal limits, as they exacerbate the deterioration of government budgets when tax revenue
is low. An economy that is less vulnerable to exogenous shocks may face less uncertainty
about the government’s ability to service its debt and, therefore, a less dispersed distribution
of ﬁscal limits. The distribution of ﬁscal limits also hinges on political willingness to service
debt. Higher political risk may reduce the ﬁscal limit.
Second, the default risk premium, reﬂecting the probability of sovereign default, is a
nonlinear function of the level of the government debt. The risk premium begins to emerge
as the level of government debt approaches the lower end of the distribution of ﬁscal limits.
Nonlinearity between the sovereign risk premia and government indebtedness is widely iden-
tiﬁed in empirical literature, see Alesina, De Broeck, Prati, and Tabellini (1992), Bernoth,
von Hagen, and Schuknecht (2006), among others. We also ﬁnd that the risk premia for
the long-term bonds move ahead of those for short-term bonds, providing early warnings
of rising default probabilities. Under a plausible calibration to the economy of Greece, the
model predicts sovereign risk premia comparable to those observed in the data.
The remainder of the paper is organized in four sections. Section 2 presents the model,
and Section 3 discusses the distributions of ﬁscal limits. The nonlinear model is solved in
Section 4. Section 5 oﬀers some conclusions.
2. Inﬁnite-horizon Model
In this section, we lay out an inﬁnite-horizon model in which the ﬁscal limit, a measurement of
the government’s ability and willingness to service its debt, arises endogenously from dynamic
4Laﬀer curves. Consider a closed economy with linear production technology, whereby the
output depends on the level of productivity (At) and the labor supply (1−Lt). The household
consumption (ct) and government purchases (gt) satisfy the aggregate resource constraint,
ct + gt = At(1 − Lt) (1)

















The government ﬁnances lump-sum transfers to households (zt) and exogenous and unpro-
ductive purchases by collecting tax revenue and issuing one-period bonds (bt). The tax
revenue is raised through a time-varying tax rate (τt) on labor income. Let qt be the price of
the bond in units of consumption at time t. For each unit of bond, the government promises
to pay the household one unit of consumption in the next period. However, the bond con-
tract is not enforceable. At time t, the government may partially default on its liability
(bt−1) by a fraction of ∆t ∈ [0,1]. The post-default government liability is denoted as bd
t.
The default scheme depends on the distribution of the ﬁscal limit, which arises endogenously
from the dynamic Laﬀer curve. Section 2.3 provides a further discussion of the ﬁscal limit
and default scheme.
τtAt(1 − Lt) + btqt = (1 − ∆t)bt−1 | {z }
bd
t
+gt + zt (3)
We assume that the government follows a simple tax rule, designed to capture the tax
policy in the real world as ﬁscal authorities tend to increase tax rates when government debt
rises.4 We refer to the parameter of γ as the “tax adjustment parameter”. A larger γ means
that the government is more willing to retire debt by raising the tax rate. τ and b represent
the tax rate and government debt level at the steady state.






(γ > 0) (4)
In addition, we assume that the lump-sum transfers are countercyclical and the gov-
ernment purchases follow an exogenous AR(1) process. The assumptions follow from the
estimation that the elasticity of real transfers with respect to real GDP per worker (ζz) is
4The tax rule speciﬁcation is similar to Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2007).
5negative for most developed countries from 1971 to 2007, varying from -0.093 to -2.22. On
the other hand, the sign of the estimated elasticity of real government purchases with re-

























where z and g represent the lump-sum transfers and government spending at the steady
state.
2.2 Household
With access to the sovereign bond market, a representative household chooses consumption






s.t. At(1 − τt)(1 − Lt) + zt − ct = btqt − (1 − ∆t)bt−1 (8)
with policies and prices (τt,zt,∆t) taken as given. Et is the mathematical expectation con-
ditional on the information available at time t, including the sovereign default information.
The utility function (u(c,L)) is strictly increasing in consumption and leisure. β ∈ (0,1) is
the discount factor.
The household’s ﬁrst-order condition requires that the marginal rate of substitution be-
tween consumption and leisure equates to the after-tax wage. The government bond price
in Equation 10 reﬂects the household’s expectation about the probability and magnitude of
sovereign default in the next period.
uL(t)
uc(t)








The optimal solution to the household’s maximization problem must also satisfy the following
5The key results of this paper do not change even if we assume both lump-sum transfers and government













where Qt+j+1 is the stochastic discounted factor from time t to time t + j + 1.
2.3 Fiscal Limit and Laﬀer Curve
The proportional tax on labor income distorts a household’s behavior as it lowers the after-
tax wage and may induce households to work less. Depending on the existing rate, an
increase in the tax rate on labor income may or may not raise the tax revenue. In general,
higher rates increase the revenue when the existing tax rate is low, but they reduce the
revenue when the existing rate is high, which is the basis for the Laﬀer curve. Laﬀer curves
are usually dynamic in the sense that the shape of the Laﬀer curve depends on the state of
the economy.6
For a given exogenous state (At,gt), a tax rate exists such that a higher rate does not raise
more revenue. This point is the peak of the dynamic Laﬀer curve, denoted as τmax(A,g), at
which the government can raise the maximum level of ﬁscal surplus, because the government
purchases and the lump-sum transfers only depend on the exogenous state. The ceiling of the
ﬁscal surplus constrains the maximum level of debt that the government is able to pay back,
which is the expected sum of the discounted maximum ﬁscal surplus in all future periods.7
The government, however, may not be willing to raise the ﬁscal surplus at the maxi-
mum level due to political considerations. Standard & Poor’s (2008) states that “... the
stability, predictability, and transparency of a country’s political institutions are important
considerations in analyzing the parameters for economic policymaking.” Without resorting
to a structural political economy model, we introduce a political risk parameter (θt) into
the model. Higher political risk (a lower θt), as a result of a lack of political consensus or a
turnover of power across political parties with diﬀerent ideologies, implies a lower probability
that the government will be able to collect the maximum ﬁscal surplus. We assume that
the maximum ﬁscal surplus that the government is willing to raise is proportional to the
political risk parameter. For a given state of the economy (At,gt), the maximum primary
ﬁscal surplus that government is willing to raise (smax
t ) depends on the political risk in the
6Trabandt and Uhlig (2009) compute Laﬀer curves for the United States and 15 European countries using
a neoclassical model.
7Cochrane (2011) emphasizes the impact of the ﬁscal limit upon monetary policy in the discussion of






t − gt − zt) (0 ≤ θt ≤ 1). (12)
where T max represents the total tax revenue when the tax rate is at the peak of Laﬀer curve
(τmax). Equation 12 implies that if the political risk is extremely high and θt is zero, then the
government simply rolls over its debt and the primary ﬁscal surplus is zero in that period.
On the other hand, if the political risk is extremely low and θt is one, then the government
is willing to raise the maximum ﬁscal surplus.
To this end, we can deﬁne the ﬁscal limit as the maximum level of debt that the govern-









t − gt − zt) (13)
Qmax represents the discount rate when the tax rate is at τmax. Appendix B describes how
to use Markov Chain Monte Carlo simulation to produce the distribution of the ﬁscal limit,
which is approximated as a normal distribution, denoted as N(b∗,σ2
b).
It is important to emphasize that the ﬁscal limit, deﬁned in Equation 13, is independent
of the equilibrium conditions of the model. Given the structural parameters of the model and
the speciﬁcation of the shock processes, the unique mapping between the peak of dynamic
Laﬀer curve (τmax) and the exogenous state of the economy (A,g) determines the distribution
of the ﬁscal limit, regardless of the equilibrium conditions of the model.
2.4 Default Scheme
The default scheme depends on the realization of the eﬀective ﬁscal limit (b∗
t), which is a
random draw from the distribution of the ﬁscal limit. If the debt surpasses the eﬀective
ﬁscal limit, then the government partially defaults. The assumption of a partial default is
an abstraction from debt renegotiation. Looking at the historical data, Reinhart and Rogoﬀ
(2009) show that creditors can often get a signiﬁcant share of what they are owed after
contentious debt negotiations. The random nature of the eﬀective ﬁscal limit reﬂects the
fact that debt renegotiation involves political considerations from which we abstract.








b∗ if bt−1 ≥ b∗
t
The more dispersed the distribution, the higher the default rate becomes, because a more
dispersed distribution implies greater uncertainty over the government’s ability and willing-
8ness to service its debt. If the level of government debt equals the mean of the distribution
(b∗), then the government would default enough to bring the debt level below the lower
boundary of the distribution, deﬁned as two standard deviations below the mean (b∗ −2σb).
3. Distribution of Fiscal Limit
As shown in Equation 13, the distribution of ﬁscal limits is country-speciﬁc and depends on
the underlying parameters including but not limited to political uncertainty, the degree of
countercyclical transfers, the size of the government, and shock processes.8 In this section,
we ﬁrst compute the distribution of the ﬁscal limit by calibrating the model to a ‘typical’
developed country in the sense that all of the parameters are set to the average over all
developed countries in the sample. We then change one parameter at a time in order to
understand how each parameter aﬀects the distribution of the ﬁscal limit. Finally, we move
a step further by calibrating the model to six diﬀerent countries in three groups: Canada and
New Zealand, Belgium and Italy, and Japan and Sweden. We ﬁnd that the predicted distri-
butions of ﬁscal limits are qualitatively consistent with the observed sovereign downgrades
in those countries.
3.1 Benchmark Calibration
The model is calibrated at annual frequency. The household discount rate is 0.95 and the
net interest rate is 5.26%.9 The utility function is assumed to be u(c,L) = logc + φlogL.10
The leisure preference parameter (φ) is calibrated in such a way that the household spends
25% of time working and the Frisch elasticity of labor supply is 3. The total amount of time
available to each household and the productivity level at the steady state are normalized to
1.
Following Arteta and Galina (2008), we use the International Country Risk Guide’s
(ICRG) index of political risk to calibrate the parameter θt. The ICRG index stays fairly
stable across time for most developed countries. Therefore, we ﬁx θt over time and calibrate
it to the average ICRG index, which has been available since 1984. The higher the ICRG
index, the lower the political risk. As the index is measured at a scale of 0 to 100, we
calibrate θt to the ICRG index scaled by 100. The calibrations of the other variables are
8In an open economy model, ﬁscal limits can potentially be aﬀected by other parameters, for instance,
the currency of the debt and the ratio of external debt to total debt.
9In the related literature, Uribe (2006) uses an annual real interest rate of 6%, and Aiyagari, Marcet,
Sargent, and Seppala (2002) use a rate of 5%.
10Due to the logarithmic speciﬁcation of leisure in the utility function, the wealth and substitution eﬀects
from a change of government purchases cancel out.
9explained in Appendix A. We simulate the distribution of ﬁscal limits using Markov Chain
Monte Carlo method, following the steps in Appendix B.
3.2 General Comparison
In the benchmark case, we calibrate the model to a ‘typical’ developed country. The gov-
ernment purchase-GDP ratio (g/y) is calibrated to the average share of the real government
purchases over the GDP across all countries in the sample between 1971 and 2007, which
is 21.3%. Similarly, the average lump-sum transfers are 15.7% of the GDP and the average
tax rate is 36.2%. The average of the estimated ζz is -0.947, implying that a decrease of
productivity by 10% raises the lump-sum transfers by 9.47%. Using a HP ﬁlter, both the
productivity and the government purchase shocks have an average persistence of 0.553 and
an average standard deviation of 0.02. The ICRG index of political risk is 83 on average.
Figure 3 shows the distribution of the ﬁscal limit. Following Equation 13, the ﬁscal limit
(B∗) is computed in terms of the level of government debt. However, in order to provide
a meaningful illustration, the simulated ﬁscal limit is scaled by the steady-state output in
Figure 3. In each plot, the horizontal axis represents the ﬁscal limit scaled by the steady-
state output, and the vertical axis represents the distribution density. The solid blue line
in each plot shows the distribution under the benchmark calibration, which has a mean (b∗)
of 0.328, equivalent to 131.2% of the steady-state output, and a standard deviation (σb) of
0.0113. We then change one parameter at a time to understand how the diﬀerent parameters
aﬀect the distribution of ﬁscal limits.
3.2.1 Government Size
The ratio of government purchases over the GDP averages 21.3% across all countries in the
sample. The highest average share is 29% in Sweden, and the lowest average share is 13.7%
in Switzerland. In the top left panel of Figure 3, we keep all of the other variables the same as
in the benchmark case, but vary the share of government purchases over the GDP from 29%
to 21.3% and 13.7%. The variance of the distribution is roughly invariant, but the mean rises
dramatically from 30% of the steady-state output to 236%. Lower government purchases
increase the maximum feasible ﬁscal surplus at each period and, therefore, signiﬁcantly
increase the ﬁscal limit. Similarly, dramatic changes are presented in the top right panel of
Figure 3, as the lump-sum transfers change from 22.4% of the GDP (Austria) to 15.7% (the
benchmark case) and 8.4% (Australia).
103.2.2 Countercyclical Lump-sum Transfers
In the left panel of the second row of Figure 3, the elasticity of lump-sum transfers with
respect to productivity (ζz) changes from -2.22 (Sweden) to -0.947 (the benchmark case)
and -0.093 (Austria), while the other parameters are calibrated to the benchmark case. The
mean of the distribution does not change, but the standard deviation doubles from 0.0076
to 0.017. Strong countercyclical ﬁscal transfers, arising from a large automatic stabilizer or
discretionary countercyclical policy, can aggravate the volatility of the ﬁscal limit, as the
government transfers more resources to households when tax revenue is low.
3.2.3 Political Risk
In the right panel of the second row of Figure 3, when θ decreases from 0.96 (Netherlands)
to 0.83 (the benchmark case) and 0.59 (Greece), the mean of the distribution decreases from
152% of the steady-state output to 130% and 93%.11 A lower political risk (a higher θ)
indicates that the government is more willing to service its debt.
3.2.4 Shock Process
In the third row of Figure 3, we compare the distributions when the persistence and standard
deviation of the productivity shock change. In the left panel, the shock persistence varies
from 0.747 (Spain) to 0.553 (the benchmark case) and 0.342 (Italy), while in the right panel
the standard deviation changes from 0.034 (New Zealand) to 0.02 (the benchmark case) and
0.014 (France). The standard deviation of the distribution is reduced from 0.019 to 0.008
in both panels. The economy may face a more dispersed distribution of ﬁscal limits if the
productivity shock is more persistent or volatile.
The shock persistence of government purchases varies from 0.726 (Canada) to 0.553 (the
benchmark case) and 0.2 (Denmark) in the left panel of the bottom row, while the standard
deviation changes from 0.0288 (Ireland) to 0.02 (the benchmark case) and 0.0147 (France)
in the right panel. The distributions of ﬁscal limits, however, are roughly invariant. This
outcome is model-speciﬁc. Due to the logarithmic speciﬁcation of leisure in the utility
function, the wealth and substitution eﬀects from a change of government purchases cancel
out.
11The ICRG index of political risk is quite stable over time for developed countries. The highest index in
the sample is from the Netherlands in 2001, and the lowest is from Greece in 1986.
113.3 Country Analysis
In this section, we calibrate our model to three groups of countries: Canada and New
Zealand, Belgium and Italy, and Japan and Sweden, so that we can compare the predicted
distributions of ﬁscal limits to the observed sovereign downgrades. Table 1 compares the key
parameters across the three groups.
Table 1: Country Analysis
Canada New Zealand Belgium Italy Japan Sweden
τ 32.4 31 43 36 26 49
g/y 23 20.5 23.8 20 16.2 29
z/y 12 13.4 18.8 17.8 10 19.5
ζz -1.25 -0.82 -0.63 -0.73 -1.15 -2.22
θ 0.84 0.85 0.8 0.7 0.84 0.86
ρA 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.56 0.66
σA 0.02 0.04 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.015
3.3.1 Canada versus New Zealand
Canada and New Zealand are very similar in terms of average tax rates, average government
spending shares, average transfer shares, and average ICRG indices of political risk. The
estimated elasticities of lump-sum transfers with respect to productivity are also comparable
for the two countries .
However, the two countries have been treated diﬀerently by the rating agencies, as illus-
trated in the top row of Figure 2. From 1983 to 1992, the rating of New Zealand government
debt was reduced by three notches from AAA to AA- as its gross debt climbed from 58% to
75% of the GDP. The Canadian government, on the other hand, was able to keep its AAA
rating until the gross debt hit 90% of the GDP in 1992. The rating was reduced by one
notch to AA+ and then stayed at this level until 2001.
An important reason for this discrepancy is that the economy of New Zealand is less
diversiﬁed than that of Canada. For instance, Standard & Poor’s (2007) sees the economic
structure of New Zealand as relatively narrowly-based and heavily reliant on agriculture,
reporting that agriculture accounted for close to 7% of New Zealand’s GDP and 58% of its
export receipts. This type of economic structure makes New Zealand particularly vulnerable
to international commodity price ﬂuctuations and global economic slowdowns. During the
period between 1970 and 2007, the standard deviation of the detrended real GDP per worker
in New Zealand is about twice as large as that of Canada.
12We simulate the distributions of ﬁscal limits for both countries. In order to illustrate
the impact of the variance of the productivity shock upon the distribution, we keep all the
other parameters the same for two countries. The average tax rate is set to 0.32, the average
government purchase-GDP ratio to 0.21, the average transfer-GDP ratio to 0.13, the average
political risk to 0.85, and the elasticity of transfers with respect to productivity to -1.25. The
standard deviation of the productivity shock is estimated to be 0.04 in New Zealand and 0.02
in Canada, while the persistence is estimated to 0.6 for both countries. Since the government
purchase shock process does not have much impact on the distribution, we keep it constant.
The top panel of Figure 4 shows that the distribution of ﬁscal limits is much more
dispersed in New Zealand than in Canada. Given the same level of government debt, a less
diversiﬁed economy is more vulnerable to exogenous shocks and thus may face tighter ﬁscal
restrictions.
3.3.2 Belgium versus Italy
Both Italy and Belgium accumulated massive public debt in the 1990s, well above 100% of the
GDP, as shown in the middle row of Figure 2. However, only the Italian government received
persistent downgrades, while Belgium’s rating has been stable. One possible explanation is
that Belgium demonstrated strong political will to be ﬁscally responsible by making great
strides in reforming the welfare program and reducing lump-sum transfers by about 10% of
the GDP since 1980. In contrast, a high level of public debt has been sustained in Italy since
1980 in spite of ﬁscal consolidation attempts that have occurred periodically in the country.
The two countries are very similar in regard to the average transfer shares and the elas-
ticity of transfers with respect to productivity . The productivity shock processes feature a
similar standard deviation and fairly comparable persistence. They are also fairly compara-
ble in terms of the average tax rates and the average government spending shares. However,
the average ICRG index of political risk is lower in Italy than in Belgium during the period
between 1988 and 1995 when the Italian government bond was downgraded.
In the simulation, we set the average tax rate to 0.4, average government spending-GDP
ratio to 0.225, average transfer-GDP ratio to 0.18, and the elasticity of transfers with respect
to productivity to -0.7 in both countries. The standard deviation of the productivity shock
is set to 0.018 and the persistence to 0.5. The political risk parameter, nevertheless, is set
to 0.7 in Italy and 0.8 in Belgium.
The middle panel of Figure 4 shows that the mean of the distribution of the ﬁscal limit
is lower in Italy than in Belgium. A lack of political will to act on the deterioration of
public ﬁnances raises political uncertainty, which is often an important factor in sovereign
downgrades.
133.3.3 Japan versus Sweden
The comparison of Japan and Sweden sheds some light on how the size of a government
and the degree of countercyclical transfers aﬀect the distribution of ﬁscal limits. The two
countries are similar in terms of political risk and the estimated productivity shock process.
However, the two countries are very diﬀerent in terms of average tax rates, average govern-
ment spending shares, average transfer shares, and the elasticities of transfers with respect
to productivity.
A repeated warning from the rating agencies is that Sweden’s large general government
sector constrains its ﬁscal ﬂexibility and puts Sweden in an unfavorable position relative
to its peers (see Standard & Poor’s (1997, 2009)). On the other hand, Standard & Poor’s
(2001) claims that Japan could still maintain ﬁscal ﬂexibility in the medium term when the
government gross debt climbed to 140% of the GDP in 2001.
We simulate the distribution of ﬁscal limits in both countries by setting the political
parameter to 0.86, the persistence of productivity shock to 0.6, and the standard deviation
to 0.018. All of the ﬁscal variables are calibrated to match the historical data. The bottom
panel of Figure 4 illustrates that a large ﬁscal transfer program generates small ﬁscal margins
for maneuver and places a short leash on the level of government debt.
4. Sovereign Risk Premia: Nonlinear Solution
Based on the country comparisons in Section 3, we have analyzed how the ﬁscal limit de-
pends on macroeconomic fundamentals. In this section, we take a step further to study the
quantitative impact of sovereign risk premia upon the economy by calibrating the model to
the economy of Greece, which experienced a severe ﬁscal crisis in 2010. Due to the existence
of the ﬁscal limit, the model can not be solved through linearization. Instead, we resort to
the monotone mapping method and solve the nonlinear model.
4.1 Method
The solution method, following Coleman (1991) and Davig (2004), is based on the conjecture
that candidate decision rules reduce the system to a set of expectation ﬁrst-order diﬀerence





, into the stock of government debt in the same period (bt). The mapping is
denoted as bt = fb(ψt). The state variable of the post-default government liability (bd
t)
incorporates the information of the eﬀective ﬁscal limit at time t (b∗
t) and the pre-default
government liability (bt−1).
14The complete model consists of a system of nonlinear equations, including the ﬁrst-order
conditions from the household’s maximization problem, Equations 9 and 10; the government
budget constraint, Equation 3; the speciﬁcations of ﬁscal policy, Equations 4 and 5; the
aggregate resource constraint, Equation 1; the speciﬁcations of shock processes, Equation 2
and 6; the transversality condition, Equation 11; and the speciﬁcation of the default scheme,
Equation 12.
After substituting into the conjectured rule, the core equation of the model is,
bd
















The expectation in the right-hand side is evaluated using a numerical quadrature. Equation
14 is solved for each set of state variables deﬁned over a discrete partition of the state space.
The decision rule (fb(ψ)) is updated at every node of the state space. The procedure is
repeated until a iteration updates the current decision rule by less than some ǫ > 0 (set to
1e − 8).
After ﬁnding the decision rule for government bonds (fb(ψ)), we can solve the pricing
rule (q = fq(ψ)) using the government budget constraint, Equation 3. The interest rate on
government bonds can also be solved using Rt = 1/qt, denoted as fR(ψ).
4.2 Calibration to the Economy of Greece
The ﬁscal parameters are calibrated to match the Greek data from 1971 to 2007. At the
steady state, the government purchases are set to 16.7% of the GDP, the lump-sum transfers
to 13.34% of the GDP, and the government debt to 40% of the GDP.12 The resulting tax
rate is 0.32 at the steady state, which is slightly higher than the average tax rate of 0.28 in
the data. The estimated elasticity of real lump-sum transfers with respect to real GDP per
worker (ζz) is -0.45. The tax adjustment parameter (γ) is estimated to be 0.42.13
The ICRG index of political risk for Greece indicates a regime-switching process. It
stayed low and stable during the period between 1984 and 1993, rose from the level of 60 to
80 between 1994 and 1996, and then stayed at a high level until the ﬁnancial crisis erupted
in 2008. The regime switching in the middle 1990s may be due to the establishment of the
12The data of government debt is from European Commission (2009).
13γ is estimated through linear regression of the tax rate over government debt-GDP ratio during the
period of 1971 to 1995, because the debt-GDP ratio is almost ﬂat from 1995 to 2007.
15European Union, while the recent switching could be related to the political uncertainty in
the wake of the ﬁnancial crisis. In this model, we model θt as a two-state symmetric Markov
regime-switching process. The low state (θL) is set to be 0.61, which is the average ICRG
index of political risk between 1984 and 1993 scaled by 100, and the high state (θH) is 0.78,
which is the average ICRG index from 1994 to 2007 scaled by 100. We assume that the
probability of switching between the two states is 1/13, as Greece enjoyed a stable and high
ICRG index within 13 years from 1994 to 2007.
Using a HP ﬁlter, the productivity shock has a persistence of 0.45 and a standard de-
viation of 0.0328, while the government purchase shock has a persistence of 0.426 and a
standard deviation of 0.0294. Both shock processes are discretized by means of the method
in Tauchen (1986).14 All of the other parameters are calibrated in the same way as the
benchmark calibration in Section 3.1.
Figure 5 shows that the distribution of the ﬁscal limit is more dispersed if the political risk
is a Markov regime-switching process than if ﬁxed at either a low or a high level. We focus
on the Markov regime-switching case in the following sections. The mean of the distribution
(b∗) is 0.4255, around 170% of the steady-state output, and the standard deviation (σb) is
0.0266. Following the default scheme described in Section 2.4, the default rate (δ) is 0.125.
4.3 Decision Rule
The pricing rule of the interest rate maps a three-dimension state space to a one-dimension
state space, Rt = fR(bd
t,At,gt). The rule is a four-dimension surface in a single graph. For
simplicity, we plot slices of the surface by ﬁxing two variables at a time.
With the government purchases kept at the steady-state level, the top panel of Figure
6 compares the response of net interest rate to the level of current government liabilities
(bd
t) under diﬀerent levels of productivity. In order to provide a meaningful illustration, the
horizontal axis shows the debt level scaled by the steady-state output (bt/y), instead of the
debt level itself. The two green vertical lines, labeled b∗ and b∗
2std, are the mean and lower
boundary of the distribution, with the lower boundary being deﬁned as the debt level that
is lower than the mean by two standard deviations (b∗
2std = b∗ − 2σb). The dashed red, solid
blue, and dashed-dotted black line represent the responses of the interest rate when the level
of productivity is respectively two standard deviations lower than the steady state (Low A),
at steady state, and two standard deviations higher than the steady state (High A).
Two ﬁndings follow from the comparison. First, the net interest rate rises with govern-
14 Tauchen (1986) provides a method for choosing values for the state variables and the transition prob-
abilities so that the resulting ﬁnite-state Markov chain mimics closely an underlying continuous valued
autoregression.
16ment liability in a nonlinear way. The interest rate rises sharply as government liability enters
the lower end of the distribution of the ﬁscal limit. The ﬁnancial market starts to demand a
premium for the government bond as the risk of sovereign default begins to emerge. Second,
the level of productivity has a substantial impact on default risk premia. For a given level of
current government liability, the lower the level of productivity, the higher the interest rate,
i.e., the dashed red line lies above the dashed-dotted black line. In a recession, tax revenue
is slashed and the government has to issue more debt in order to ﬁnance its expenditures.
A higher debt level can substantially raise the sovereign default probability and, therefore,
the risk premium on the government bond.
The bottom panel of Figure 6 compares the responses of the interest rate to the post-
default government debt under diﬀerent levels of government purchases with the level of
productivity kept at the steady-state level. Again, the interest rate rises sharply as the
government liability enters the lower end of the distribution of the ﬁscal limit. However,
diﬀerent levels of government purchases have similar impact on the interest rates, as the
dashed, solid and dashed-dotted lines lie close to each other. Government purchases aﬀect the
level of government debt in two opposite directions. Higher purchases drive the government
liability up on one hand, on the other hand, they crowd out private consumption and force
households to work more via an income eﬀect. A higher output raises the tax revenue,
helping to ﬁnance government purchases. Overall, diﬀerent government purchases do not
have a signiﬁcant impact on the interest rate due to the logarithmic speciﬁcation of leisure
in the utility function.
4.4 Nonlinear Simulation
Figure (7) illustrates the nonlinear simulation. At the period t = 1, the government debt is
set to 115% of the GDP, similar to the debt level that the Greek government had accumulated
by 2009. In the following ﬁve periods, the economy receives a sequence of positive government
spending shocks and negative productivity shocks. The simulated paths of productivity and
government purchases over GDP ratio, summarized in the following table, are meant to
capture the countercyclical government spendings in a severe economic downturn.
t=1 t=2 t=3 t=4 t=5 t= 6
Productivity -4.88% -8.61% -9.97% -6.67% -4.21% -1.92%
Government Spending-GDP 20.35% 21.68% 21.81% 21.08% 20.29% 19.52%
As shown in Figure 7, the representative household works and consumes less when pro-
ductivity is low. The lower tax revenue, as a result of a lower labor supply and lower
17productivity, and higher government purchases increase the government debt. The inter-
est rate rises partly because the household substitutes away from future consumption and
partly because the government liability approaches the eﬀective ﬁscal limit (the green line
(b∗
t)) which is randomly drawn from the distribution of the ﬁscal limit, N(b∗,σ2
b). The
government budge further deteriorates through rising interest payments.
In order to disentangle the eﬀect of the intertemporal substitution from the risk premium
in the rising interest rate, Figure 7 compares the default model with a default-free economy
in which the default rate (δ) is zero. The solid black lines represent the default model, while
the dashed blue lines represent the default-free economy under the same sequences of shocks.
The risk premium of a one-period bond is deﬁned as the interest rate diﬀerential between
the two economies and found to be around 60 basis points over a prolonged period.
4.5 Long-term Bond
In practice, the interest rate spreads of long-term bonds, rather than short-term bonds, are











We use a ﬁnite-element method to approximate the decision rules of a one-period bond. The
multiple-period expectation is calculated using Markov Chain Monte Carlo simulation.
Conditional on the same sequences of shocks as in Figure 7, Figure 8 illustrates that
the default risk premia for the long-term bonds move ahead of those for the short-term
bonds, which provides an early warning of an increasing probability of sovereign default.
The expectation of higher government indebtedness in the future results in a rise in current
risk premia for long-term bonds, even when those for short-term bonds are still ﬂat. The
longer the bond maturity, the earlier the default risk premia begin to emerge.
5. Conclusion
We present a general equilibrium framework in which an endogenous and stochastic ﬁscal
limit measures the government’s ability and willingness to service its debt. The distribution
of the ﬁscal limit depends on underlying economic fundamentals, such as the size of the
government, the degree of the countercyclical ﬁscal policy, economic diversity, and political
uncertainty. Due to the existence of the ﬁscal limit, the model produces a nonlinear rela-
tionship between the default risk premia and the level of government debt. The risk premia
18start to emerge as the level of debt approaches the ﬁscal limit.
This DSGE framework, which predicts distributions of ﬁscal limits to be consistent with
the sovereign ratings observed in developed countries, can shed light to policy debates around
the world in diﬀerent dimensions. First, what are the tradeoﬀs between short-run stabiliza-
tion and long-run sustainability when the perceived riskiness of government debt depends,
in part, on the current and expected ﬁscal environment? This question is partially addressed
in ? in the case study of Sweden in the ﬁnancial crisis of the early 1990s. Second, will a
ﬁscal consolidation be possibly expansionary when the government debt is close to the ﬁscal
limit?
Another important direction for future research is to study the interaction of monetary
policy and ﬁscal policy in the presence of the ﬁscal limit. Will monetary policy’s ability
to control inﬂation be jeopardized? More importantly, what will be the optimal monetary
policy responses in a monetary union when some member country faces sovereign default
risk? This line of analysis would also relate to recent work by Sims (2004, 2009), Cochrane
(2011), Davig, Leeper, and Walker (2010), and Daniel and Shiamptanis (2010).
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21A Data Appendix
Unless otherwise noted, all of the ﬁscal variables are calibrated to the data from the OECD
Economic Outlook No. 84 (2009) for the period between 1971 and 2007. The gross debt
is deﬁned as all ﬁnancial liabilities of general government, typically mainly in the form
of government bills and bonds. The average tax rate is deﬁned as the ratio of the total
tax revenue over the GDP, including social security, indirect and direct taxes. The total
government purchases include government consumption of ﬁxed capital and government ﬁnal
consumption of expenditures. Lump-sum transfers are deﬁned as the sum of social security
payments, net capital transfers and subsidies. Using a Hodrick and Prescott (1997) ﬁlter, we
detrend the data of the real GDP per worker from Penn World Table Version 6.2 (see Heston,
Summers, and Aten (2009)) and estimate the shock process of productivity. The elasticity of
lump-sum transfers with respect to productivity (ζz) is estimated using the detrended data
of real lump-sum transfers and real GDP per worker.
The sample includes Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Switzerland, Germany, Den-
mark, Spain, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, New
Zealand, United Kingdom, and United States.
B Simulation of Fiscal Limit
In this model, the choices of household consumption and labor supply only depend on the
income tax rate and the exogenous state variables (A,g). Assume the utility function is
u(c,L) = logc + φlogL. The household ﬁrst-order conditions can be written as,
1 − Lt =
At(1 − τt) + φgt
At(1 + φ − τt)
(B.1)
ct =
(At − gt)(1 − τt)
1 + φ − τt
. (B.2)
The tax revenue (Tt) is,
Tt = τt
At(1 − τt) + φgt
1 + φ − τt
= (1 + 2φ)At − φgt −
￿
At(1 + φ − τt) +
(1 + φ)φ(At − gt)
1 + φ − τt
￿
. (B.3)
22The tax revenue reaches to the maximum level (T max
t ) when the tax rate reaches the peak




t = 1 + φ −
s





t = (1 + 2φ)At − φgt − 2
p
(1 + φ)φAt(At − gt) (B.5)
Since there exists a unique mapping between the exogenous state space (A,g) to τmax and
T max, the ﬁscal limit (B∗) can be obtained using Markov Chain Monte Carlo simulation.
First, for each simulation, we randomly draw the shocks of productivity and government
purchases for 400 periods. Assuming that the tax rate is always at the peak of the dynamic
Laﬀer curves, we compute the paths of all other variables following the household ﬁrst-order
conditions and the budget constraints. According to Equation 13 in Section 2.3, we compute
the discounted sum of maximum ﬁscal surplus by discarding the ﬁrst 200 draws as a burn-in
period.
Second, we repeat the simulation for 100,000 times and obtain the distribution of the
ﬁscal limit. Since the simulated distribution is well approximated by a normal distribution,
we report the approximated normal distributions in Figure 3, 4 and 5.








































































24Figure 2: Comparison of sovereign downgrades (dashed blue line, measured to the left axis)
and government debt-GDP ratio (solid green line, measured to the right axis) in selected
countries from 1975 to 2010
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25Figure 3: Comparison of the distribution of ﬁscal limits as one parameter changes in each
panel. The solid blue line in each panel is under the benchmark calibration.





















































































































26Figure 4: Comparison of the distribution of ﬁscal limits in diﬀerent groups of countries: top
panel (New Zealand vs. Canada); middle panel (Italy vs. Belgium); bottom panel (Sweden
vs. Japan).





























27Figure 5: The distributions of ﬁscal limits in Greece under diﬀerent speciﬁcations of political
risk: high political risk (low θ), Markov-switching political risk, and low political risk (high
θ).















28Figure 6: The pricing rule of net interest rate r(b) = 100(R(b)−1): top panel compares the
pricing rules at diﬀerent levels of productivity while the government purchases are at steady
state; bottom panel compares the rules at diﬀerent levels of government purchases while the
productivity is at steady state.













































































29Figure 7: Nonlinear simulations under negative productivity shocks combined with positive
government purchase shocks: stochastic default case (solid black line) vs. default-free case
(dashed blue line)



















































































30Figure 8: Risk premia for long-term bonds with diﬀerent maturities conditional on the same
path of shocks as in Figure 7
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